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Abstract
The main objective of this paper was to visualize the relation between government
spending on basic education and the human capital accumulation process, observing
the impacts of this spending on individual investments in higher education, and on
economic growth. It is used an overlapping-generations model where the government
tax the adult generation and spent it in basic education of the next generations. It
was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal effect of government spending
in basic education on growth crucially depends on public budget constrains. The paper
explains why some countries with a lot of public investment in basic education growth
at low rates. In that sense if a country has only a lot of public investment in basic
education without investment in higher education it may growth at low rates because
the taxation can cause distortions in the agents incentives to invest in higher education.
Keywords - Human Capital, Economic Growth, Government Spending.
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11 Introduction
The understanding of the differences in economic growth trends among countries is
the main objective of endogenous growth models. Ever since the seminal article pub-
lished by Lucas (1988), this theory has emphasized that differences in human capital
accumulation among countries is a key factor in explaining their differences in growth.
It then became necessary to understand the human capital accumulation process, and
consequently, the reasons why countries’ do not converge towards the same level of
human capital. This study aims at contributing towards this debate by constructing
ﬁve complementary theoretical models addressing the relation between government
spending on basic education and the accumulation of human capital, and consequently
economic growth.
Since the government is directly responsible for the majority of the investments
in basic education in most countries, it is possible to relate the accumulation of hu-
man capital to government spending. In this sense, several articles have constructed
theoretical models relating government spending on education to economic growth, in
which government investment in education has a direct effect upon the accumulation
of human capital, and consequently on long run growth. Included here are articles by
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992, 1997, 1998), Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), Kaganovich
and Zilcha (1999), Cassou and Lansing (2001), Blankeanu (2005) and Blankenau and
Simpson (2004). At the same time, other articles have pointed out the indirect relation
between government spending on education and the accumulation of human capital
through private sector subsidies as, for example, in Zhang (1996), Milesi-Ferretti and
Roubini (1998), Hendricks (1999), Brauninger and Vidal (1999) and Bouzahzah et. al.
(2002).
However, theempiricalevidenceregardingtherelationbetweengovernmentspend-
ing on education and growth is not consensual. Cullison (1993) and Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1999) found a positive relation between government spending on education
and growth, while Zhang and Casagrande (1998) determined that the subsidizing of
education incremented economic growth in developing as well as developed countries.
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) also found such a relation, but for only certain speciﬁca-
tions, while Levine and Renelt (1992) concluded that government spending on public
education is not robustly correlated with rates of growth.
Thus, it may be argued that although the theoretical models constructed for this
2relationarecorrectregardingthedirectionoftherelation, itispossiblethatsomeaspect
of this relation has not been considered, as veriﬁed by the asymmetry of the empirical
evidence. In that sense Judson (1998) and Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004)
argue that the composition of human capital between basic and higher education is
important to explain the relation between human capital and economic growth, and
Miller and Russek (1997) and Kneller and Gemmell (1999) shows that the government
budget constrains are relevant to understand the relevance of human capital as engine
of growth.
This study built a model of overlapping generation including these two compo-
nents, the composition of government expenditures in education and the budget con-
strains of the government together, in an attempt to provide theoretical answers to the
empirical difﬁculties evidenced by this relation.
Toward this end, using UNESCO data between 1999 and 2001, we observed that
in countries with high per-capita GNP, a lower proportion of overall government out-
lays for education is spent on basic education, as compared to countries with lower per
capita GNP. For example, the United States, United Kingdom and Japan respectively
spent 31.4%, 24.4%, and 35% of their overall outlays for education on primary edu-
cation, while Chad, Bangladesh, Lesoto and Niger respectively spent 57.5%, 38.1%,
48.6% and 49.3% (Su, 2004). Although this evidence is not conclusive, it poses a ques-
tion: is the composition of government spending on education important with regard
to its signiﬁcance in determining long run growth?
The fundamental goal of this study was to visualize the relation between govern-
ment spending on basic education and the human capital accumulation process, ob-
serving the impacts of this spending on individual investments in higher education,
and on economic growth. It was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal ef-
fect of government spending in basic education on growth crucially depends on (i) the
composition of government spending with regard to basic and higher education (ii) the
public budget constrains.
This paper is divided into an additional ﬁve sections. In the following section, we
consider the basic model to be discussed; in section three the government is introduced
in the basic model, and in section four three non-linear models are formalized. In sec-
tion ﬁve, the relation between government spending on basic education and economic
growth is discussed, based on the ﬁve models developed. Lastly, in section six, we put
forth our concluding remarks.
32 The Basic Model
In this section, the simplest model possible was designed in order to provide a clearer
view of its main characteristics. A overlapping generation model was designed, in
which the agents have three periods in their lives. The ﬁrst period is the childhood,
where agents receive an exogenous human capital stock, H. The second period begin
in the moment when the agent reaches the age of entering the labor market, having
to allocate all his or her time between working or increasing his or her human capital
stock, and the third period in which the agent only works. The agent’s consumption in
the second and in the third of these periods is determined respectively by the following
equations:
ct = (1 ¡ ht)Ht (1)
ct+1 = Ht+1 (2)
where, c is the agent’s consumption, h is the number of hours dedicated to the accumu-
lation of human capital, and H is the agent’s human capital stock. It must be pointed
out that in period t the agent is endowed with an initial human capital stock Ht which
is exogenous, which was accumulated prior to the period in which the agent reaches
the age of entering the labor market. Thus, following Su (2004), it may be considered
that the agent’s ﬁnal human capital stock shall be an additive function of the hours
spent in accumulating human capital in higher education and the human capital stock
accumulated in the initial period. Therefore, the human capital stock in period t+1 is
given by,
Ht+1 = ht + Ht (3)
In this model, the entire product is consumed by the agent, and the production
function is given solely by multiplying the number of hours worked by his or her
human capital stock. Since in the second period the agent only works, his or her
production is equal to the human capital stock times one.
Thus, the agent shall choose the number of hours that he or she will allocate be-
tween work and the accumulation of human capital in the ﬁrst period in order to max-
imize his or her intertemporal utility function. In other words, assuming CRRA, he or

















where µ 2 <+ is the risk aversion coefﬁcient, and ¯ 2 (0;1) is the temporal discount
rate. Hence, by substituting (3) in (2), and then (1) and (2) in (4), the consumer’s















where H ´ Ht since Ht+1 no longer appears, and h ´ ht.
Solving this problem, we obtain the following ﬁrst order condition,
[(1 ¡ h)H]
¡µ (¡H) + ¯ (h + H)
¡µ = 0 (6)
By performing algebraic manipulations in order to isolate h, obtained the agent’s













From this equation, it is possible to obtain the result used in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The number of hours dedicated to the accumulation of human capital,
h, is related to the agent’s initial human capital stock, H. In particular, when µ is less
than 1, this relation is positive.


























































































































or, in other words,
1 ¡ X > Y ¡ Z (11)































Thus, if µ < 1, then X < 0, and consequently, 1 ¡ X > 1. At the same time,
it is evident that Y < 1, and that Z > 0, implying that Y ¡ Z < 1. Therefore,
1 ¡ X > Y ¡ Z, implying that @h/@H > 0.
Proposition1isofvitalimportancebymakingitclearthatinvestmentsmadeduring
an individual’s childhood affect the economic decisions that this individual will make
in adulthood. Speciﬁcally with regard to the accumulation of human capital, we have
that the more human capital an individual accumulates during childhood, the more
time this individual will allocate towards accumulating human capital in adulthood if
µ < 11. This proposition thus puts forth that the most important government edu-
cation spending would be that directed towards basic education, since agents’ would
be directly stimulated to accumulate human capital in adulthood for having reached
adulthood with a high human capital stock.
1Substantial empirical work has been devoted to estimating µ under the assumption that it is indeed
constant. Estimates of µ vary substantially but some important studies ﬁnd a value below unity (e.g.
Bansal and Yaron, 2004 where µ = 0:66 and Gruber, 2006 where µ = 0:5).
6We can observe two effects that determines the causal relation between human cap-
ital accumulation in childhood and in the adulthood. An increase in the exogenously
given human capital stock H, gives rise to two effects: an income effect which tends
to decrease the hours dedicated to human capital accumulation h, and a substitution
effect which tends to increase them. If agents have a relatively low degree of risk aver-
sion (µ < 1) then the substitution effect dominates the income effect and h rises due to
an increase in H.
We could now ask ourselves how this result would be affected if we were to include
government that invests in basic education, but that also taxes adults, or furthermore,
observe the changes brought about by these results if non-linearities, such as decreas-
ing returns to human capital in the production function, or hours spent by individuals
in accumulating human capital were introduced in the model. These aspects will be
dealt with in the following sections.
3 The Model with Government
In the previous section, we saw that the human capital stock accumulated by ”school
age” agents points to an increase in the number of hours spent on human capital ac-
cumulation as adults. Thus, since the public sector is primarily responsible for the
agents’ basic education, we may consider that the human capital stock obtained by the
agents during school age is a function of government spending on basic education with
regard to GNP. We then have that,
H = '" (12)
where " 2 (0;1) represents the government spending on education/GNP ratio, and ' >
0 is a constant that represents the marginal productivity of government spending with
regard to the human capital stock. Thus, considering that the government expenses
toward ﬁnancing basic education in childhood (period 1) are obtained with a ﬂat tax
rate on the income of the adult agents in periods 2 and 3, that is " = ¿, the agent’s
consumption in each period shall be given by,
ct = [(1 ¡ h)'"](1 ¡ ") (13)
ct+1 = ['" + h](1 ¡ ") (14)
7It must be pointed out that basic education spending is ﬁnanced by revenue col-
lected in previous generations. Hence, agents will be confronted by an intertemporal
trade-off between human capital accumulation and taxation. From these equations,






































From this result, we may then move on to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The number of hours spent on accumulating human capital, h, is re-
lated to the amount of government spending on basic education, ". In particular, when
µ is less than 1, this relation is negative.
Proof: To prove this proposition, a sign analysis is performed on @h/@", from (17)

























µ from here it is clear that for µ < 1, Ω < 0 and the partial
derivative becomes negative.
8The result presented in proposition 2 is very conﬂicting with the result presented
in proposition 1. The change is basically the inclusion of a tax related to the invest-
ment in basic education. Thus, although human capital is growth enhancing, public
investments in basic education need be ﬁnanced by a tax on adulthood generation, and
it causes a crowding-out effect in their private investment in education. It may explain
the inconclusive results of the empirical literature relating public investments in basic
education and economic growth.
4 Non-Linear Models
The results obtained in the sections above were constructed considering a perfect case
of linearity, entailing effects of scale with regard to human capital, investment in hu-
man capital, and government spending. However, said functional forms are not a con-
sensus. Jones (1995), for example, developed several arguments against this type of
linearity, and demonstrates that results varied drastically when decreasing returns were
considered. We shall now introduce three types of decreasing returns individually, and
observe their effects on the results of the models.
4.1 Decreasing Returns to Human Capital Stock
We shall initially consider the possibility of human capital having decreasing returns
in the production function. Consequently, the agent’s consumption in the two periods
is given by,
ct = [(1 ¡ h)('")
®](1 ¡ ") (19)
ct+1 = ['" + h]
® (1 ¡ ") (20)
where ® 2 (0;1) provides the value of the decreasing returns to education in produc-
























Thus, from this relation, we may formulate proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The number of hours spent on the accumulation of human capital, h,
is related to the amount of government spending on basic education, ". In particular,
said relation is negative if µ® < 1.
Proof: In order to prove this proposition, we must apply the implicit function
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From the above equation, it becomes clear that dh=d" is negative when µ® < 1,
although the sign of this relation may not be determined when µ® > 1
Proposition 3 is clearly a special case of the result in proposition 2. Once again
it is very probable that public spending in basic education discourages the further ac-
cumulation of human capital. But with decreasing returns in production function the
perverse effect of tax on investment in human capital is stronger.
4.2 Decreasing Returns to Human Capital Accumulation
Let us now consider the possibility of the agent being confronted with decreasing re-
turns to human capital accumulation; in other words, the marginal return to the number
of hours spent accumulating human capital is decreasing since more hours are spent
on this activity. In this case, the agent’s consumption in each time period is given by,
ct = (1 ¡ h)'"(1 ¡ ") (24)
ct+1 = ('" + h
°)(1 ¡ ") (25)
where ° represents the decreasing returns to human capital accumulation. Hence, the
























From this relation, we may then move on to the result put forth in proposition 4.
Proposition 4 The number of hours expended on the accumulation of human capital,
h, is related to the amount of government spending on basic education, ", and, in
particular, this relation is negative if µ < 1.
Proof: In order to prove the above proposition, we must apply the implicit function
































From the above equation, it becomes clear that dh=d" is negative when µ < 1,
although the sign of this relation may not be determined when µ > 1.
Thus, as in the previous subsection, we have that the agents would not necessarily
be stimulated to accumulate human capital with increases in government spending on
basic education. Hence, in the presence of decreasing returns, either regarding human
capital, or human capital accumulation, the government spending in public education
discourages further human capital accumulation.
4.3 Decreasing Returns to Government Spending on Education
Lastly, we shall observe the possible effects that decreasing returns to government
spending on education have on the accumulation of human capital. In this case, the
agent’s consumption functions are given by,
ct = (1 ¡ h)'"
Á(1 ¡ ") (29)
11ct+1 = ['"
Á + h](1 ¡ ") (30)
where Á represents the decreasing returns to public spending on basic education with



































































From this equation, we may then move on to the result put forth in proposition 5.
Proposition 5 The number of hours spent on the accumulation of human capital, h, is
related to the amount of government spending on basic education, ", although the sign
of this relation may not be determined.
Proof: To prove this proposition, we must perform a sign analysis of @h/@" from































The sign of this equation cannot be determined for any parameter value.
Proposition 5 indicates a result similar to that of proposition 2 where public in-
vestment in basic education may causes a crowding-out effect on further investment in
human capital.
5 GovernmentSpendingonBasicEducationandGrowth
From the models developed in the previous sections it was possible to observe the
effects that government spending on basic education have on economic growth. In
order to simplify our analysis, the population was held constant, i.e., the number of
younger individuals is always equal to the number of older individuals. We then have
that workers’ average level of schooling is given by,
¯ H =
'" + ('" + h)
2
(35)
for the model with linear government outlined in section 3, as well as the model with
decreasing returns to human capital in the production function. For the model with
decreasing returns to investment in human capital, this average is given by,
¯ H =
'" + ('" + h°)
2
(36)
And for the model with decreasing returns to government spending on basic edu-








Thus, since the population held constant, we have that economic growth is propor-
tional to the increase in the average level of schooling of workers. Therefore, from the
above equations, it is possible to derive the rate of economic growth for each one of



















































































Where the above equations are the rates of economic growth of the models with
government, listed according to the order in which the models appear in this study.
It is thus not possible to afﬁrm, in any of the cases, that an increase in government
spending on basic education would necessarily lead to an increase in the average num-
ber of years of schooling, and consequently, in production. In particular, when there
are decreasing returns to the human capital stock or to human capital accumulation,
considering the µ < 1 hypothesis, we have that the average level of schooling would
increase less than government spending on education, possibly implicating a negative
or hardly signiﬁcant relation. In the other cases, as when the sign of dh/d" cannot be
determined, this relation may assume high or non-signiﬁcant values, depending on the
model’s parameter values.
The immediate conclusion of this study is that, since government spending on ba-
sic education may have a negative effect on agents’ incentive to accumulate human
capital via higher education, if the government allocates a higher value to basic edu-
cation in detriment to higher education subsidies, these expenditures may be insignif-
icant with regard to the human capital stock and economic growth. This conclusion
explains the non-consensus with regard to the signiﬁcance of this relation, explain-
ing the stylized fact described in the introduction, where countries with high levels of
government spending on basic education in detriment of higher education have lower
per capita GNP levels with regard to the rest. It thus becomes clear that the compo-
sition of government spending between basic and higher education is important with
regard to the signiﬁcance of the relation between public spending on education and
economic growth. These conclusions are very similar to the empirical results obtained
in Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004).
146 Concluding Remarks
This paper sought to investigate the relation between public spending on basic edu-
cation and economic growth. As evidenced by the constructed models, this relation
is not trivial, and there may be a drastic change in results according the theoretical
speciﬁcations adopted.
In this paper, ﬁve complementary theoretical models were constructed. The ﬁrst
model is a simple private-choice human capital accumulation model, in which the
agents’ are endowed with an initial stock of human capital when entering the labor
market. In this case, it becomes clear that agents tend to accumulate more human
capital when they are endowed with a higher initial human capital stock. This result
is important for it demonstrates that the human capital accumulated by agents during
childhood affects the economic decisions made during their lives.
The second model proposed introduces government in the context, and observes
how government spending on basic education interacts with the private decision to
accumulate human capital. In this case, the sign of the relation between public spend-
ing on education and the private accumulation of human capital is negative in an usual
economy. This result arises from the fact that an increase in education spending, which
increases agents’ initial human capital stock via an increase in revenue collection, pro-
motes and hinders human capital accumulation for different reasons.
The subsequent models proposed introduced different types of decreasing returns
to the model with government: decreasing marginal returns to the human capital stock
in the production function, to hours spent in accumulating human capital, and to public
spending on basic education. In the model with decreasing returns to the human capital
stock and its accumulation we concluded that an increase in government spending on
basic education implicates a decline in private human capital investment, and in the
model with decreasing returns to government spending the results are not substantially
different.
Fromtheresultsobtained, wemayreachthecentralconclusionthatbasiceducation
affects agents’ decisions over their lifetime, and that the signiﬁcance of the relation
between public spending on education and economic growth may be insigniﬁcant or
negative in some cases because public spending in basic education may discourage the
further accumulation of human capital.
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